

2003

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### Recommended Citation

Quynh-Nhu Vuong, *U.S. Peacekeeping and Nation-Building: The Evolution of Self-Interested Multilateralism*, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L LAW. 804 (2003).

Available at: <http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol21/iss3/15>

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# U.S. Peacekeeping and Nation-Building: The Evolution of Self-Interested Multilateralism

By  
Quynh-Nhu Vuong\*

In the days leading up to the 2000 presidential election, George W. Bush declared that, if elected, one of his first actions would be to withdraw American troops from peacekeeping operations in faraway places, especially U.S. troops in Kosovo and the former Yugoslavia. This did not happen. Two years later, the United States remains as ensconced in peacekeeping operations as it was during the Clinton administration. A combination of factors, foremost among them the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, has caused Bush to reconsider his unilateralist and isolationist stance and to remain committed to peacekeeping operations across the globe.

Peacekeeping and nation-building operations, which require extensive logistical planning and military resources, have generally been the responsibility of international organizations, namely the United Nations. The U.N. authorizes peacekeeping operations on the principle that an impartial multilateral presence supporting a truce will increase the willingness of those in conflict to follow through with their negotiations. The U.N. adds legitimacy to a peacekeeping operation since "action [is] taken on behalf of a global organization rather than on the basis of national or regional interests."<sup>1</sup> Unilateral action, to the contrary, is not only less desirable, but also less effective. Quite simply, solitary states do not have the financial wherewithal, military capacity, or political capital to effectively undertake such comprehensive and complex operations. In assessing the U.S. role in peacekeeping, the question, then, does not turn on whether it conducts peacekeeping missions in a unilateral or multilateral fashion, since the United States has never undertaken a peacekeeping operation on its own. Instead, the examination turns on the extent to which the United States participates in such operations at all, and whether U.S. cooperation is based on a traditional multilateral perspective, which this paper defines as a willingness to consistently support international peacekeeping forces in order to promote global peace and security, even when it does not necessarily serve immediate or vital U.S. interests.

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1. *How Peacekeeping is Financed*, at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/intro/5.htm> (last visited Dec. 3, 2002).

When analyzing U.S. policy towards peacekeeping, two events stand out as major turning points. First, the end of the Cold War and the first Bush administration's vision for a "new world order" marked the beginning of a powerful U.S.-backed U.N. peacekeeping force, along with a greatly expanded model of peacekeeping. Second, Clinton's establishment of Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25) forced the United States to adopt a watered-down model of multilateralism—one in which the United States maintained its involvement in multinational forces, but only in conflicts directly related to national self-interest.

This article reviews the current U.S. approach to peacekeeping and nation-building and assesses whether it reflects a multilateral or a unilateral perspective. It argues that Bush's policy towards peacekeeping does not fall into the traditional binary frameworks of "unilateralism" or "multilateralism." Instead, this article contends that Bush's policy reflects a new concept: "self-interested multilateralism," an idea that actually took form during Clinton's second term in office. Self-interested multilateralism is best defined as a commitment toward using a multilateral framework as a means to further the interests of the particular state, rather than toward the betterment of the collective group as a whole.

This article is divided into three sections. First, it defines and provides background on peacekeeping and nation-building operations. Second, it describes U.S. involvement in peacekeeping and nation-building operations from 1988 to 2000 (encompassing the George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations). Third, it examines current international peacekeeping and nation-building operations and analyzes how the present Bush administration's foreign policy has affected U.S. involvement.

## I. BACKGROUND

Peacekeeping and nation-building, although two distinct concepts, are closely intertwined. The traditional model, in which peacekeeping operations are independent from nation-building, is fading. Generally, peacekeeping operations commence prior to nation-building, and help facilitate a stable environment in which nation-building operations can begin. Traditional peacekeeping operations are defined as positioning a force between former belligerents to monitor a cease-fire and to create political space for negotiation of the underlying dispute.<sup>2</sup> These types of missions are conducted only with the full consent of the parties involved in the conflict, and after a cease-fire has already been brokered.<sup>3</sup> Nation-building operations, in contrast, include "measures organized to foster economic and social cooperation to build confidence among previously warring parties; [the development of] social, political and economic infrastructure to prevent future violence; and lay[ing] the foundations for a durable

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2. William J. Durch, *Keeping the Peace: Politics and Lessons of the 1990s*, in U.N. PEACEKEEPING, AMERICAN POLICY, AND THE UNCIVIL WARS OF THE 1990s 1, 3 (William J. Durch ed., 1996).

3. *Id.*

peace.”<sup>4</sup> Since the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping operations have expanded to include activities generally associated with nation-building, where peacekeepers are authorized to assist in implementing peace agreements with the goal of producing a long-term settlement of the underlying conflict.<sup>5</sup> These types of multidimensional peacekeeping operations have become increasingly common.

Traditional and multidimensional peacekeeping operations share several important characteristics.<sup>6</sup> First, both operations react to international conflict and are not deployed until some type of conflict has already begun.<sup>7</sup> Second, the operations must be authorized by the U.N. Security Council, and must follow a mandate established by the Council.<sup>8</sup> The Security Council, which comprises fifteen members, is the primary oversight body for peacekeeping operations.<sup>9</sup> Third, peacekeeping forces are created ad hoc, established each time under the direction of the U.N. Secretary-General.<sup>10</sup> Lastly, authorized operations are always administered and coordinated directly by the U.N.<sup>11</sup>

The first U.N. peacekeeping operation began in May 1948, when the Security Council established the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) to supervise a truce following the first Arab-Israeli war.<sup>12</sup> UNTSO was an observation mission where peacekeepers were sent in to monitor the ceasefire and prevent isolated incidents from escalating.<sup>13</sup> This operation was a precursor to what is now considered the traditional peacekeeping model.<sup>14</sup> In 1956, after Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, the U.N. established United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I), “to supervise withdrawal of invading forces and act as a buffer between Egyptians and Israelis.”<sup>15</sup> UNEF I is considered the first traditional peacekeeping mission, because it “established a basic set of principles and standards which have served as the basis for the creation of all other

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4. Michael W. Doyle, *Introduction: Discovering the Limits and Potential of Peacekeeping*, in PEACEMAKING AND PEACEKEEPING FOR THE NEW CENTURY 1, 3 (Olara A. Otunnu & Michael W. Doyle eds., 1998). Nation-building is often described as peacebuilding, or post-conflict peacebuilding. This article treats all these terms interchangeably.

5. *Id.* at 6.

6. PAUL F. DIEHL, *INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING* 11 (1993).

7. *Id.*

8. *Id.*

9. *The Making of a Peacekeeping Operation*, at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/intro/4.htm> (last visited Nov. 30, 2002). Such decisions require at least nine votes in favor and are subject to veto by any of the Security Council’s five permanent members. The Secretary-General selects the Force Commander, and member states are asked to aid the operation by supplying troops, personnel, supplies, equipment, transportation, and logistical support. *Id.*

10. DIEHL, *supra* note 6, at 12.

11. *Id.* at 13.

12. *Preface to United Nations Peacekeeping*, at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/intro/intro.htm> (last visited Feb. 28, 2003); *An Evolving Technique*, at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/intro/1.htm> (last visited Feb. 28, 2003).

13. *Timeline of U.N. Operations*, at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/timeline/pages/onust.html> (last visited Dec. 1, 2002).

14. DIEHL, *supra* note 6, at 28-29 (“The first true peacekeeping operation came about because peace observation, in the form of UNTSO, could not meet the challenges of the Suez Crisis, and there was not sufficient political consensus for a collective security action.”).

15. *Timeline of U.N. Operations*, *supra* note 13.

missions.”<sup>16</sup> UNEF I was unprecedented because it was under the direct charge of the U.N. Secretary-General and under the field command of an officer selected by the U.N.<sup>17</sup> Further, UNEF I was mandated to not only monitor the cease-fire between forces, but act as a physical barrier between protagonists, and act as a buffer against conflict between Arab and Israeli forces.<sup>18</sup>

Following the end of the Cold War, the U.N. modified the traditional peacekeeping model by ushering in multidimensional peacekeeping operations. This shift reflected George H.W. Bush’s (hereinafter “Bush I”) vision for a “new world order.” Under this “new world order,” the U.N. was “freed from Cold War stalemate” and able to “fulfill the historic vision of its founders; a world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a home among all nations.”<sup>19</sup> With increased support from the United States, the U.N. expanded its peacekeeping duties to include such aspects as:

[D]isarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.<sup>20</sup>

One example of this new multidimensional peacekeeping model is the 1992 U.N. peacekeeping operation in Cambodia, commonly known as the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). After peace agreements in 1989, Cambodia was in position to establish a single unified government.<sup>21</sup> The Supreme National Council (SNC) was established as the Cambodian government, and it delegated to the U.N. the authority to ensure implementation of the settlement.<sup>22</sup> Enforcement of the settlement encompassed both military and civilian elements. Military elements were not limited only to the supervision of the cease-fire, but included demobilization of faction armies, locating and confiscating weapons and military supplies, assisting with de-mining, and releasing prisoners.<sup>23</sup> UNTAC was also mandated to organize and conduct elections, coordinate repatriation of refugees, and develop and implement human rights protection programs.<sup>24</sup> UNTAC left Cambodia in 1993, and although it did not

16. JOHN HILLEN, *BLUE HELMETS: THE STRATEGY OF U.N. MILITARY OPERATIONS* 82 (1998).

17. DIEHL, *supra* note 6, at 31 (“This was a significant step forward from any previous peace observation missions in which units were directed by their own national commanders. In this sense, the troops were truly international servants, even enjoying a form of diplomatic immunity from local law.”).

18. *Id.*

19. MICHAEL G. MACKINNON, *THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. PEACEKEEPING POLICY UNDER CLINTON* 15-16 (2000).

20. BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI, *AN AGENDA FOR PEACE: PREVENTATIVE DIPLOMACY, PEACE-MAKING AND PEACE-KEEPING* (Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992) 32 (New York: United Nations, 2nd ed. 1995).

21. James A. Schear, *Riding the Tiger: The United Nations and Cambodia’s Struggle for Peace*, in *U.N. PEACEKEEPING, AMERICAN POLICY, AND THE UNCIVIL WARS OF THE 1990s* 135, 138 (William J. Durch ed., 1996).

22. *Id.* at 139.

23. *Id.* at 142.

24. *Id.*

fulfill its entire mandate, the overall mission was considered a success.<sup>25</sup> Today, these multidimensional peacekeeping operations are more common.

Due to the complexities inherent in multidimensional operations, greater resources, including increased funding and larger peacekeeping forces, are required. These forces must be built from scratch from contributions by participating countries.<sup>26</sup> The United States, for the most part, has kept American troops out of peacekeeping missions for two reasons: (1) the general unwillingness of the United States to put American soldiers at risk unless there is a vital interest, and (2) the government's strong policy against allowing U.S. troops to fall under U.N. command.<sup>27</sup> This policy is reflected in the Weinberger Doctrine, established in 1984 by then-Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger. The doctrine outlined six conditions that must be met before U.S. forces are deployed abroad: (1) there is an important U.S. interest at stake; (2) the United States is in a position to commit sufficient resources to win; (3) the objectives are clearly defined; (4) the United States is willing to sustain the commitment; (5) there is a reasonable expectation that congress and the general public will support the operation; and (6) alternatives have proven ineffective.<sup>28</sup> Generally, this policy discourages U.S. participation in multilateral engagements, unless the operation directly advances American objectives.

## II.

### U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN PEACEKEEPING: 1988–2000

The level of U.S. involvement in U.N. peacekeeping operations has fluctuated from the very beginning. The Security Council is responsible for maintaining international peace and security, and the United States is one of the Security Council's five permanent members, which affords it veto power against any operation. In the early years, the Security Council's role in peacekeeping was minimal. This was because tensions from the escalating Cold War prevented the permanent members of the Security Council from agreeing to expand U.N. authority to mobilize and employ military forces in its operations.<sup>29</sup> During the Cold War, the United States supported U.N. peacekeeping operations by providing political, financial, and military assistance.<sup>30</sup> During this time period, the United States paid the largest single share of U.N. peacekeeping expenses,<sup>31</sup> and

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25. *Id.* at 172-74.

26. *The Making of a Peacekeeping Operation*, *supra* note 9.

27. *See* Durch, *supra* note 2, at 15-17 (describing other reasons why the United States avoids sending troops).

28. *About the "Powell Doctrine,"* at <http://www.afa.org/magazine/Aug1999/0899powell.html> (last visited Dec. 4, 2002).

29. *See* Lieut. Col. Steven J. Lepper, *Symposium on Hot Spots in International Law: War Crimes and the Protection of Peacekeeping Forces*, 28 AKRON L. REV. 411, 412 (1995) ("The best example of this progress is that we no longer have a Security Council that is bogged down in superpower politics with the United States or Soviet Union, opposing each other when either wants to respond to some of the atrocities occurring around the world.").

30. Durch, *supra* note 2, at 10.

31. *Id.* However, in the 1970s, the United States began to display frustration over the perceived uncontrolled growth of U.N. expenditures. In order to pressure the U.N. to reform its man-

provided advanced military logistics capabilities that were essential in allowing U.N. forces to gain access to critical peacekeeping areas.<sup>32</sup>

During the tense relations of the Cold War, "there was often little opportunity for the U.N. to play an active role in world events deemed important by the competing superpowers."<sup>33</sup> After the Cold War, however, greater cooperation by Russia made increased U.N. activity possible. Although the United States was emerging as the sole military power with the means to act unilaterally, both the first Bush and Clinton administrations deferred to the U.N. when confronting international affairs and crises.<sup>34</sup> As a result, the number of U.N. field missions (including peacekeeping and functioning offices) doubled between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s.<sup>35</sup>

#### A. *The first Bush administration*

Bush I began his term in 1988 with an arguably multilateral perspective of peacekeeping. His expressed interest in greater multilateral policies brought hope that the United States would increase its involvement in U.N. peacekeeping and nation-building efforts. While U.S. support for peacekeeping operations was limited to logistical support and transportation, "[b]y the summer of 1992, the [first] Bush administration concluded that this limited role was no longer tenable and that, if the United Nations was to succeed, the United States would have to weigh in more heavily."<sup>36</sup> Bush I believed that the state of world affairs, post-Cold War, would allow the U.N. to play a central role in peacekeeping. He expressed his wish for states to "recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice . . . where the strong respect the rights of the weak."<sup>37</sup>

In response to this increased enthusiasm by the United States, the U.N. bolstered the role of U.N. peacekeeping. However, this was problematic because the growth was too rapid. For many reasons, the United States did not respond well. In particular, the poor response was due to "the lack of U.S. experience in such operations during the Cold War, and even more so, because U.S. military intervention doctrine of the time (the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine) did not lend itself well to the passive tenets of traditional peacekeeping."<sup>38</sup> The United States had a difficult time justifying participation under the Weinberger

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agement, congress voted to withhold contributions to the organization. The United States would withhold contributions unless the General Assembly agreed to pass all future budget resolutions by consensus, rather than only requiring majority vote. *Id.* at 11.

32. *Id.* at 10.

33. MACKINNON, *supra* note 19, at xiii.

34. Barry M. Blechman, *Emerging from the Intervention Dilemma*, in *MANAGING GLOBAL CHAOS: SOURCES OF AND RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT* 287, 290 (Chester A. Crocker, et al. eds., 1996).

35. See *Timeline of U.N. Operations*, *supra* note 13.

36. Ivo H. Daalder, *Knowing When to Say No: The Development of US Policy for Peacekeeping*, in *U.N. PEACEKEEPING, AMERICAN POLICY, AND THE UNCIVIL WARS OF THE 1990s* 35, 37 (William J. Durch ed., 1996).

37. President George H.W. Bush, *The World After the Persian Gulf War*, Address Before Joint Session of Congress (Mar. 6, 1991).

38. MACKINNON, *supra* note 19, at 30.

Doctrine. Bush I, realizing this limitation, attempted to work within the framework of the Weinberger Doctrine. Yet, by the end of his term, he had advocated, although vaguely, for the doctrine to be more flexible.<sup>39</sup>

During the first Bush administration, several expanded peacekeeping missions were deployed by the U.N., with support from the United States.<sup>40</sup> These U.N. missions, including ONUSAL (El Salvador), UNAVEM II (Angola), UNPROFOR (Yugoslavia), UNAMIC (Cambodia), UNTAC (Cambodia), UNIKOM (Iraq/Kuwait), and UNOSOM I (Somalia), "broke with the traditional model by their emphasis on formerly ancillary peacekeeping functions such as election monitoring and civil administration."<sup>41</sup> For example, UNIKOM was the first peacekeeping operation that was deployed without the consent of the host country (Iraq).<sup>42</sup> Of all the U.N. peacekeeping operations authorized during the first Bush administration, UNOSOM I stands out the most, due to its large-scale commitment, unprecedented complexity, and ultimate unrealized potential.

The peacekeeping operation in Somalia, although controversial, is likely Bush I's greatest attempt to direct U.S. foreign policy into the realm of true multilateralism. Although not without hesitation, Bush I joined international forces with the aim of securing global peace and humanitarian objectives, without the requirement of serving U.S. self-interest. The United States was deeply involved in the peacekeeping efforts in Somalia, both in UNOSOM I and II,<sup>43</sup> and even more importantly, in the United Task Force (UNITAF), a U.S.-led multilateral peacekeeping operation.<sup>44</sup>

The peacekeeping operations in Somalia began in response to a famine caused by a civil war. Between 1991 and 1992, fires were set across agricultural land outside of Mogadishu, Somalia's capital, as a war tactic during the conflict. This left the land unsuitable for farming. Exacerbating the situation, the region experienced a drought, which led to the famine of 1992.<sup>45</sup> By late 1992, the events in Somalia had caught the world's attention. In the United States, Senator Nancy Kassebaum advocated for U.S. intervention.<sup>46</sup> Furthermore, the media released pictures depicting those starving in Somalia. The American public became enraged by the situation. All of these factors helped to bring about U.S. intervention in Somalia.

The objectives of UNOSOM I were to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu, provide humanitarian aid, and ensure the security of relief supplies.<sup>47</sup> Because

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39. *Id.* at 30-31.

40. FREDERICK H. FLEITZ, JR., PEACEKEEPING FIASCOES OF THE 1990S: CAUSES, SOLUTIONS, AND U.S. INTERESTS 104 (2002).

41. *Id.*

42. *Id.* at 106.

43. See discussion *infra* Part II.B.1.

44. FLEITZ, *supra* note 40, at 131.

45. William J. Durch, *Introduction to Anarchy: Humanitarian Intervention and "State-Building" in Somalia*, in U.N. PEACEKEEPING, AMERICAN POLICY, AND THE UNCIVIL WARS OF THE 1990S 311, 315 (William J. Durch ed., 1996).

46. *Id.* at 317.

47. *Timeline of U.N. Operations*, *supra* note 13.

there was no central government, it was impossible to obtain consent from the conflicting parties for the deployment of an international peacekeeping force.<sup>48</sup> Therefore, UNOSOM I was limited in its mandate, and could do little more than serve as an observation mission with a large security force.<sup>49</sup> Originally, the United States played only a limited role in UNOSOM I. However, as the severity of the crisis became apparent, and pressure from the media and Congress intensified, Bush I became committed to resolving the conflict and working with the international community to establish peace in the region. In 1992, Bush I formally authorized UNITAF, a U.S.-led multinational peacekeeping operation which helped to secure relief supplies. UNITAF consisted of over 38,000 soldiers, about 25,000 of whom were American.<sup>50</sup> This marked the first deployment of U.S. soldiers to Somalia.

Bush I's multilateral perspective was reflected in both his actions and rhetoric. Although it appeared that UNITAF's mission was limited to humanitarian aid, Bush I spoke numerous times about his vision for greater U.S. involvement in peacekeeping, and for an increased emphasis on peacekeeping generally.<sup>51</sup> Furthermore, Bush I advocated a new doctrine for determining whether the United States should use military force. He did not clearly describe how this new doctrine would work, but in his farewell address, he endorsed a more flexible standard for determining when the United States should send troops on peacekeeping missions.<sup>52</sup>

### B. *The Clinton administration*

President Clinton began his term with optimistic goals of spreading democracy and human rights throughout the world. He campaigned for a more interventionist policy on human rights issues, expressing strong support for U.N. peacekeeping operations.<sup>53</sup> Clinton's "position was widely perceived as being more proactive and inclined to embrace a much more multilateral style of diplomacy than current Republican policies."<sup>54</sup> Reflecting his desire to strengthen U.S. relations with the UN, he appointed a well-respected academic, Madeleine K. Albright, to the position of Permanent Representative to the United Nations.<sup>55</sup> Ambassador Albright coined the term "assertive multilateralism" to describe the administration's policy on foreign affairs.<sup>56</sup> This policy required "continued, active US engagement in foreign affairs with maximum efforts to share that burden with others, especially through multilateral institutions."<sup>57</sup> Unfortunately, the peacekeeping failures in Somalia forced the Clinton adminis-

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48. FLEITZ, *supra* note 40, at 130.

49. HILLEN, *supra* note 16, at 186.

50. MACKINNON, *supra* note 19, at 17.

51. *Id.* at 18.

52. *Id.* at 18-19.

53. *Id.* at 19.

54. *Id.*

55. *Id.* at xv.

56. DURCH, *supra* note 45, at 327.

57. *Id.*

tration to retract the idea, leading to a new framework embodied in PDD 25. Originally, this doctrine was intended to follow in the spirit of multilateralism and essentially allow greater U.S. involvement in peacekeeping operations. But, while still in draft form, an ambush in Somalia killed eighteen U.S. Army Rangers. Public outcry over the event led to bipartisan opposition to increased peacekeeping participation, and hence, opposition to PDD 25 in its original version.<sup>58</sup> Instead, PDD 25 was revised to limit U.S. participation in peacekeeping operations.

### 1. *Assertive multilateralism and the intervention in Somalia*

Albright's notion of assertive multilateralism was immediately tested following Clinton's inauguration, as the situation in Somalia worsened due to continuing conflicts between Somali warlords, and the end of the UNITAF mandate. In March 1993, Clinton endorsed the United Nations Operations in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) mission, which included an ambitious mandate to rebuild Somalia's government.<sup>59</sup> UNOSOM II is generally considered a peacekeeping disaster. There are many different opinions as to why this operation failed, but many attribute it to the fact that the UNOSOM II mandate allowed for too much involvement by the U.N. peacekeeping force. Brian Urquhart, Former U.N. Under Secretary General for Political Affairs stated: "Both the rhetoric and the action on this occasion were a radical departure from the cautious and carefully calibrated approach to peacekeeping crises in the past. . . . Traditional peacekeeping forces were not supposed to have enemies."<sup>60</sup> The leaders of UNOSOM II wrongly assumed that Somalis would view international troops positively, somewhat forgetting that it was, after all, a civil war. In October 1993, Somalis aggressively retaliated by firing grenades at a U.S. Army helicopter; that led to a series of fighting in which eighteen U.S. soldiers and over 500 Somalis died.<sup>61</sup> As a result, Clinton withdrew U.S. troops, forcing the U.N. to terminate UNOSOM II, leaving Somalia in a state of chaos.<sup>62</sup> After this disaster, Clinton repositioned U.S. foreign policy under PDD 25, which favored a more narrowly-tailored approach to U.S. involvement in peacekeeping operations.

### 2. *The end of assertive multilateralism: PDD-25*

When Clinton first entered office in 1993, he ordered a review of U.S. peacekeeping policies through Presidential Review Directive (PRD) 13, in order to create a comprehensive policy. PRD 13 encompassed all peacekeeping operations, from traditional missions to more complex multidimensional operations.<sup>63</sup> Following the Somalia debacle, Clinton switched tactics and authorized

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58. FLEITZ, *supra* note 40, at 154-55.

59. MACKINNON, *supra* note 19, at 20-21.

60. FLEITZ, *supra* note 40, at 131.

61. *Id.* at 133.

62. *Id.*

63. Daalder, *supra* note 36, at 42.

Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, signed in May 1994. Unlike PRD 13, PDD 25 was not another comprehensive review of U.S. involvement in peacekeeping, but a systematic curtailment of American involvement, and an abrupt about-face on the policy front. PDD 25, which became the administration's official policy on multilateral peace operations,<sup>64</sup> resulted from the political pressure and negative press which surrounded the Somalia operation.<sup>65</sup> In part because of the October 1993 ambush of U.S. Army Rangers in Mogadishu, Clinton was increasingly concerned that his foreign policy stance might threaten his reelection chances and the Democratic Party's success in the 1994 congressional elections.<sup>66</sup> PDD 25, therefore, was "designed to avoid any future confrontations with congress over U.S. support of a U.N. mission, or participation in such a mission."<sup>67</sup> This is evidenced by the structure of the policy, since the number of factors to consider was dramatically expanded, thereby making it harder to justify U.S. involvement in peacekeeping operations.<sup>68</sup> PDD 25 retreated to a "'vital national interests' test and away from an expanded 'just causes' test for intervention."<sup>69</sup> This policy had the effect of decreasing the number of situations in which the United States would be involved in peacekeeping operations.

PDD 25 addressed several different areas of peacekeeping policy reform.<sup>70</sup> One major area established the standard by which the United States should determine whether to support a peacekeeping operation.<sup>71</sup> The policy identified stringent criteria, similar to the enumerated factors in the Weinberger doctrine, for determining whether U.S. personnel should participate in a U.N. peacekeeping operation.<sup>72</sup> The Weinberger doctrine and PDD 25 differ only in that PDD 25 was directed at peacekeeping operations specifically and required additional

64. *Id.* at 35-36.

65. MACKINNON, *supra* note 19, at 105-06.

66. FLEITZ, *supra* note 40, at 155.

67. MACKINNON, *supra* note 19, at 106.

68. *Id.*

69. Glenn T. Ware, *The Emerging Norm of Humanitarian Intervention and Presidential Decision Directive 25*, 44 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1997).

70. Clinton Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (PDD 25) (Feb. 22, 1996), reprinted in MACKINNON, *supra* note 19 app. 1, at 124.

71. Under PDD 25, the administration should consider the following issues when deciding whether to vote or support a proposed U.N. peace operation: (1) whether U.S. interests are being advanced, and there is international support for a multilateral force; (2) whether there is a threat to or breach of international peace and security; (3) whether the goals of the operation are clear; (4) for traditional peacekeeping operations, whether a ceasefire and consent from the parties in conflict is required; (5) for peace enforcement operations, there must be a significant threat to peace and security; (6) the means to produce a successful outcome are available including funding, forces, and an appropriate mandate; (7) the international community has determined that inaction is unacceptable; and (8) the projected duration is an accurate assessment, given the objectives and criteria for completion of the operation. *Id.* at 128-29.

72. In addition to the first eight factors, the administration must also consider the following: (1) that participation advances U.S. interests, and the risks of sending American personnel have been weighed; (2) adequate resources are available; (3) the success of the operation depends on U.S. participation; (4) the role of U.S. forces is clearly tied to the operation's objectives; (5) the U.S. Congress and the American public support the operation; and (6) the United States finds the command and control arrangements acceptable. Finally, in operations which are likely to involve combat, there must be (1) a willingness to commit sufficient forces to accomplish the operation's

considerations such as whether the success of the operation depended upon U.S. participation. The Weinberger doctrine, on the other hand, applied more generally to U.S. foreign policy.

### 3. *The effect of PDD 25: Assumption of “self-interested multilateralism”*

With the adoption and application of PDD 25, the Clinton administration entered into murky waters between unilateralism and pure multilateralism. Generally, the administration decided that it would continue to pursue humanitarian interventions under the aegis of the U.N., with the condition that the interventions relate to a “vital U.S. interest.” The Rwanda non-intervention, and the Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo interventions specifically demonstrate this idea of self-interested multilateralism.

#### a. *Rwanda*

The 1994 genocide in Rwanda—a clear example of the doctrine of self-interested multilateralism leading to non-intervention—highlights the effect of PDD 25. Rwanda came to the attention of the international community after a civil war between its two main ethnic populations, the Hutus and Tutsis, led to a series of mass murders between 1990 and 1993.<sup>73</sup> Shortly after Clinton signed PDD 25, it became evident that the civil war in Rwanda was spiraling out of control. In August 1993, the Rwandan government and rebels signed the Arusha Peace Agreement. At that time, the Clinton administration was still “in the midst of preaching its assertive multilateralism gospel,” and therefore greatly influenced the Arusha Peace Agreement.<sup>74</sup> As a result, the U.N. Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was set to be deployed. However, before formal authorization for the mission could be given, the events in Somalia occurred. Consequently, the United States was unwilling to support an expanded peacekeeping mandate, which would have included providing security throughout Rwanda and disarming militias. Instead, the United States stood by as the twentieth century’s third genocide<sup>75</sup> unfolded with brutal efficiency, leading to the eventual death of an estimated 800,000 civilians.

The events in Somalia were clearly the most influential reason why the United States retreated from intervention in Rwanda. After the ambush of the U.S. Army Rangers in Mogadishu, Clinton realized that his policy on peacekeeping would threaten his chances for reelection, and therefore, he “chose Rwanda as a chance to ‘draw a line in the sand’ and forcefully enunciate and implement [PDD 25].”<sup>76</sup> After the genocide, Clinton continued to stand by his

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objectives, (2) a comprehensive plan, and (3) a commitment to flexibility in achieving the objectives. *Id.* at 129-30.

73. FLEITZ, *supra* note 40, at 150.

74. *Id.* at 151.

75. In 1994, after Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana was killed, the Hutus (the ethnic group in power) led a campaign to exterminate the Tutsi population in Rwanda. After 100 days, an estimated 800,000 Tutsis were murdered. *Id.* at 152.

76. MACKINNON, *supra* note 19, at 109.

decision not to intervene, stating that it was not an appropriate situation for peacekeepers and that he was following the wishes of the American people to not get involved.<sup>77</sup>

*b. Bosnia-Herzegovina*

In stark contrast, the Clinton administration determined that vital U.S. interests were at stake in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and therefore, a multilateral intervention was justified. The former Yugoslavia had been in conflict since the early 1990s, and Bosnia-Herzegovina spent most of the decade in a state of war and violence. Like other regions in the former Yugoslavia, it rejected the idea of a unified Yugoslavia under Serbian control.<sup>78</sup> In 1991, Bosnia-Herzegovina declared itself an independent state. The Serbian military consequently fought to gain control of Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia, eventually putting it under siege for over a year.

At this point, the Clinton administration's self-interested multilateralist policy framework was applied. The former Yugoslavia was designated an area of vital interest to the United States for several reasons. First, in a geopolitical sense, the Balkans are a linchpin of stability (or volatility) for Europe in general. A greater conflagration in Bosnia-Herzegovina could easily spread to the whole of the former Yugoslavia and encompass Central and Eastern Europe, including Greece, Albania, and Turkey.<sup>79</sup> Second, because of Europe's economic importance to both the United States and world economy, the Clinton administration could not risk allowing a regional conflict to expand. Finally, "if the United States wishe[d] to maintain its leadership of the NATO alliance, it [had to] participate in difficult and dangerous European security operations such as the Balkan interventions."<sup>80</sup> This explains why the United States was loathe to intervene in Rwanda but committed to Kosovo; the economies of Rwanda and East Africa are simply too small and too far removed from the United States to justify a vast expenditure of weaponry and manpower, whereas the economies of Europe are vital to America's well-being.<sup>81</sup>

Accordingly, the administration made consistent and strenuous attempts to first secure a peace agreement in Bosnia (the Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement in 1995),<sup>82</sup> and then ensure its success by leading an international peacekeeping

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77. FLEITZ, *supra* note 40, at 157.

78. *History of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the Origins to 1992*, at <http://www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/bihistory.htm> (last visited Dec. 1, 2002).

79. See, John M. Broder, *Conflict in the Balkans: The Overview; Clinton Says Force is Needed to Halt Kosovo Bloodshed*, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1999, at A1 ("Mr. Clinton said the rationale to use force went beyond humanitarian concerns. He said a raging conflict in Kosovo could send tens of thousands of refugees across borders and, potentially, draw Albania, Macedonia, Greece and Turkey into the war.")

80. Michael O'Hanlon, *Come Partly Home, America; How to Downsize U.S. Deployments Abroad*, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2001, at 2.

81. See generally, James Traub, *The Bush Years; W.'s World*, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2001, § 6, at 28 (examining U.S. foreign policy towards intervention in peacekeeping operations, stated in terms of vital U.S. interests).

82. *A Breakthrough for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, at [http://www.unmibh.org/unmibh/back\\_gro.asp](http://www.unmibh.org/unmibh/back_gro.asp) (last visited Dec. 1, 2002).

force in the country. This force was known as the Implementation Force (IFOR), which was later replaced by the Stabilization Force (SFOR). SFOR was directly responsible for implementing the military aspects of the accords. Later, the U.N. authorized the U.N. Mission on Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) whose main functions included monitoring, observing, and inspecting law enforcement activities and facilities; advising and training law enforcement personnel; and assessing threats to public order and advising law enforcement agencies to handle such threats.<sup>83</sup>

c. *Kosovo*

For the same reasons as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Clinton administration also deemed Kosovo an area of vital interest. Kosovo lies to the south of Serbia and has a mixed population, the majority of whom are ethnic Albanians. In 1989, Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic decided to bring Kosovo under full Serbian control.<sup>84</sup> Opposition from the Kosovar Albanians led to open conflict between the Serbian military and Kosovar Albanian forces. Between 1998 and 1999, over 1,500 Kosovar Albanians were killed and over 400,000 displaced.<sup>85</sup>

With pressure and leadership from the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) began an air campaign against Serbian military forces in 1999.<sup>86</sup> The air strike, Operation Allied Force, lasted seventy-seven days. The air strike was successful in stopping Serbian persecution of Kosovar Albanians.<sup>87</sup> Following the conflict, a NATO peacekeeping operation (KFOR) was formed to maintain stability in the region, and to facilitate the rebuilding process.<sup>88</sup> The U.S. role in Kosovo was extensive and controversial, but consistent with the self-interested multilateralism doctrine, the United States secured the involved direct participation and involvement of over thirty countries, from Britain to Russia. The United States is currently involved in the U.N. peacekeeping operation, UNMIK, and is also a major participant in KFOR.

In conclusion, Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo demonstrate the post-PDD 25 assumption of the doctrine of self-interested multilateralism. Clinton learned his lesson the hard way from Somalia, and consequently reversed direction; after that disaster, interventions had to relate to U.S. needs, and have a distinct (and justifiable) purpose, while still involving an alliance of states working together to effect a solution.

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83. *Annex 11 of the Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement*, summary at <http://www.unmibh.org/unmibh/backgro.asp> (last visited Jan. 4, 2003).

84. *Background to the Conflict*, at <http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/intro.htm> (last visited Nov. 30, 2002).

85. *Facts and Figures*, at <http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/facts.htm> (last visited Nov. 30, 2002).

86. FLEITZ, *supra* note 40, at 162.

87. *Id.*

88. *Id.* at 162-63; *Background to the Conflict*, *supra* note 84.

### III. THE CURRENT BUSH ADMINISTRATION

It is somewhat difficult to assess the current Bush administration's approach towards peacekeeping and nation-building since Bush has only been in office for two years. Nonetheless, certain trends are already apparent, and in the wake of September 11, the administration seems to have evolved a more explicit and carefully constructed policy towards peacekeeping and nation-building.

In his campaign platform, then-Governor Bush called for a decrease in U.S. involvement in peacekeeping operations and pledged to pull American troops out of the Balkans, asserting that responsibility for those extended peacekeeping operations in the region should fall to Europe.<sup>89</sup> During his campaign, he continually stressed that the proliferation of peacekeeping operations was harming the U.S. military by decreasing troops' war readiness, and that the United States needed to redefine the military's objectives so that it was "prepared to fight and win war[s]."<sup>90</sup> Bush proposed higher defense spending and cutting back on overseas deployment.<sup>91</sup> It seemed that the new administration would follow a very different, arguably isolationist approach, to foreign policy.

Despite the rhetoric and campaign posturing, President Bush's promises are mostly unfulfilled, and this article argues that he has continued to follow the same doctrine of self-interested multilateralism that Clinton first initiated. The following sections will examine U.S. involvement in ongoing peacekeeping operations in Europe, and discuss U.S. policy following the events of September 11, and demonstrate how they reflect this doctrine of self-interested multilateralism.

#### A. *Current international peacekeeping operations*

There are currently fifteen U.N. peacekeeping operations underway.<sup>92</sup> During the first half of the current Bush administration, U.S. participation (that is, U.S. personnel, including troops, civilian police, and military observers) in these operations has not fluctuated. In December 2001, U.S. personnel constituted 1.6% of the total U.N. peacekeeping force.<sup>93</sup> That number remained the same through October 2002.<sup>94</sup> These fifteen U.N. peacekeeping operations do not include those peacekeeping operations that, although authorized by the U.N. Security Council, are run by a separate international organization, such as

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89. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., *'Nation Building'?* Yes., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2001, at A23.

90. Steven Lee Myers, *Bush Warns Against 'Overdeployment,'* N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2001, at A26.

91. Hanlon, *supra* note 80.

92. This figure includes the U.N. Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which ended on Dec. 31, 2002.

93. *U.S. Personnel Contributions to U.N. Peacekeeping Operations, as of 31 December 2001*, at <http://www.stimson.org/fopo/?SN=FO20020208313> (last visited Jan. 2, 2003). U.N. Peacekeeping operations are distinct from U.N. Peace-building operations, of which there are currently twelve (as of Feb. 2002).

94. *Id.* Total U.N. participation in UNMIBH has decreased over the two years, from 1,678 to 1,458 total U.N. personnel. *Id.*

NATO. Other important current peacekeeping operations not organized by the U.N. include the present NATO operation in Kosovo, and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.<sup>95</sup> Although the United States does not always provide troops for U.N. peacekeeping operations, the United States funds about 27 percent of the U.N. peacekeeping budget.<sup>96</sup>

### 1. *The former Yugoslavia*

Over the past two-years, the U.N. has maintained peacekeeping operations in both Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and Kosovo (UNMIK). On December 31, 2002, the UNMIBH mission closed, having completed its mandate.<sup>97</sup> UNMIK is still in operation, and the United States continues to participate. In fact, of the fifteen current U.N. operations, the United States has the greatest participation in UNMIK. As of July 2002, the United States had contributed 551 civilian police and two observers, constituting 12.3 percent of the total UNMIK force.<sup>98</sup> However, this number does not accurately reflect true U.S. participation in Kosovo, since the United States is also deeply involved with the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) that is working in conjunction with UNMIK.<sup>99</sup>

Over the last two years, the challenges facing both UNMIK and KFOR have changed. The forces are no longer positioned to protect the Kosovar Albanians from the Serbs. Instead, the forces are working to prevent Albanian retaliation against the few remaining ethnic Serbs.<sup>100</sup> This is because Kosovar militia groups are fighting for an independent state.<sup>101</sup> Ethnic Albanian guerrillas are fighting for control of a strip of Serbian territory bordering Kosovo.<sup>102</sup> In January 2001, KFOR troops were working to prevent the guerillas from gaining access to and transferring weapons and supplies to their fighters in the adjoining buffer zone.<sup>103</sup> Another challenge was the refusal by remaining Serbs to participate in the November 2001 elections, which established a provisional government.<sup>104</sup> Clearly, peace in Kosovo will require an extended presence by both UNMIK and KFOR.

When Bush entered office in 2001, the international community was concerned that he would carry through with his threats to pull U.S. troops out of international peacekeeping operations. After Joseph R. Biden, senior Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, returned from a visit to the former Yugoslavia, he became “[c]onvinced that President Bush must change his posi-

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95. *Id.*

96. Winter Casey, *U.N. Envoy Seeks Help from U.S. in Conflicts*, WASH. TIMES, June 15, 2002, at A6.

97. Press Release, United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The End of a Mandate (Dec. 31, 2002), at <http://www.unmibh.org/pressreleases/view.asp?PressID=72>.

98. *U.S. Personnel Contributions to U.N. Peacekeeping Operations*, *supra* note 93.

99. FLEITZ, *supra* note 40, at 162-64.

100. *Id.* at 163.

101. *Id.*

102. Michael R. Gordon, *NATO Patrols Edgy Border, This Time Protecting Serbs*, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2001, at A1.

103. *Id.*

104. FLEITZ, *supra* note 40, at 163.

tion on America's role in the Balkans."<sup>105</sup> Biden stressed the necessity of maintaining stability in the region, and argued that Europe's security was central to America's security.<sup>106</sup> Further, he believed that U.S. military presence and leadership were essential to the success of peacekeeping operations.<sup>107</sup> Shortly after entering office, Bush attended a roundtable discussion with employers of the National Guard and Reservists, where he stated that "[t]here will be no precipitous withdrawal from the commitments we inherited, but as we go forward we will be careful about troop deployment, [and] judiciously use our troops."<sup>108</sup> His statement suggested that the United States would not abandon peacekeeping operations immediately, but that new peacekeeping operations would be unlikely. Showing further signs that no substantial change in U.S. participation would occur anytime soon, in May 2001, NATO ambassadors "decided that only modest cuts can safely be made at this time," and that U.S. troops would only be reduced from 3,600 to 3,100.<sup>109</sup> In addition, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, after visiting U.S. peacekeeping forces stationed along the Kosovo-Macedonia border in June 2001, expressed the need for American troops in Kosovo, because he believed that they were needed to prevent violence in the region, especially given the escalating violence along the Macedonian border.<sup>110</sup> Finally, in July 2001, President Bush declared in a speech to the American troops stationed in Kosovo that the allied forces "came in together, and we will leave together."<sup>111</sup> It became apparent that Bush would not follow through on his previous commitment to withdraw U.S. troops from the former Yugoslavia.

### B. *Effect of September 11 on U.S. policy*

Since the events of September 11, 2001, there has been significant rhetoric on how U.S. foreign policy will and should change in order to win the war on terrorism and ensure U.S. security. This change has directly affected Bush's approach towards peacekeeping and nation-building. Intuitively, one would assume that in the wake of September 11, the administration would increase its commitment to peacekeeping and nation-building. This has not necessarily been the case. While Bush has significantly augmented U.S. efforts towards nation-building, the U.S. commitment to peacekeeping operations has not increased in the post-September 11 era. In fact, as will be discussed below, factors suggest that U.S. participation and involvement in peacekeeping operations have significantly diminished. Nonetheless, the decreased involvement in peacekeeping is still consistent with the overall idea of self-interested multilateralism. On the

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105. Biden, *supra* note 89.

106. *Id.*

107. *Id.*

108. President's Remarks in a Roundtable Discussion with Employers of National Guard Personnel and Reservists in Charleston, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 7 (Feb. 14, 2001).

109. Michael R. Gordon, *NATO Plans Only Modest Bosnia Cutback*, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2001, at A4.

110. James Dao, *Rumsfeld Says U.S. Must Be in Balkans, But Not Become Mired*, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2001, at A6.

111. Remarks to United States Troops at Camp Bond Steel, KOSOVO, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1095, 1096 (July 24, 2001).

other hand, the administration has decided that nation-building is a critical concept in its war on terrorism. Thus, the United States is pursuing nation-building efforts in locales like Afghanistan within a consistent multilateral framework (albeit in a self-interested manner).

### 1. *Declining U.S. involvement in peacekeeping operations*

Even after September 11, Bush has continued to maintain his disfavor towards U.S. involvement in peacekeeping. Four examples stand out. First, in June 2002, the Bush administration decided to close the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute (PKI), the only U.S. government entity devoted to peacekeeping.<sup>112</sup> It was decided that the functions of PKI would be absorbed by the Center for Army Lessons Learned. Currently, the PKI has a ten person staff and an annual budget of \$200,000. The Pentagon claimed that the closure is due to budget cuts; however, some believe that the closure is more of a symbolic move, made to underscore U.S. opposition to American troops participating in peacekeeping operations.<sup>113</sup>

Second, following through on his promise to decrease deployments abroad, the administration has made plans to reduce U.S. military participation in the multinational peacekeeping force in Sinai,<sup>114</sup> where American troops presently constitute almost half of the total peacekeeping force.<sup>115</sup> At the same time, the United States has said it still fully supports the force, and will continue to aid the force financially.

Third, Bush has used peacekeeping as a bargaining tool against the international community to immunize U.S. troops from the International Criminal Court (ICC). In May 2002, the U.S. notified the U.N. that it would not become a party to the Rome Convention, which establishes an international criminal court, because the administration believes there are significant problems with the treaty, including infringement of American sovereignty.<sup>116</sup> In July of that year, the Bush administration vetoed a Security Council Resolution which would have extended the U.N. peacekeeping mandate in Bosnia, in response to the international community's reluctance to give U.S. peacekeeping troops full immunity from ICC jurisdiction.<sup>117</sup> However, after the veto, the United States agreed to give a three-day extension, and then a twelve-day extension, in order

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112. Jim Lobe, *Politics: Pentagon to Close Only U.S. Peacekeeping Institute*, INTER PRESS SERV., June 4, 2002.

113. *Id.*

114. *U.S. Plans to Reduce Presence in Sinai Peacekeeping Force*, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2002, at A4.

115. About 900 of the 1900 member force are Americans. "The United States military currently contributes headquarters staff of more than thirty troops, a support battalion of some 300 regular Army soldiers and a National Guard infantry battalion of more than 500 troops." *Id.*

116. *The International Criminal Court*, at <http://www.state.gov/s/wci/rls/fs/2002/9978pf.htm> (last visited Nov. 30, 2002).

117. Serge Schmemmann, *U.S. Vetoes Bosnia Mission, Then Allows 3-Day Reprieve*, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2002, at A3.

to allow for further negotiations.<sup>118</sup> By the end of the extension, the U.N. had adopted a resolution that grants American troops immunity for one year.<sup>119</sup> As a result, the United States allowed the U.N. to renew its peacekeeping operations in Bosnia.

Fourth, President Bush has been reluctant to contribute to peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan. In January 2002, President Bush and Afghan Chairman Hamid Karzai “issued a joint statement, putting the United States behind an effort to build a lasting partnership for the 21st century, determined to fight terrorism, and ensure security, stability and reconstruction for Afghanistan.”<sup>120</sup> However, as peacekeeping operations were being assembled, President Bush declared that he was not sending U.S. peacekeeping troops to the region. The administration made clear that it does not intend to participate in an international security force.<sup>121</sup> As a result, the peacekeeping operation, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was formed without U.S. troops. Further, President Bush long opposed expansion of the ISAF to other regions beyond Kabul, as well as any increase in force size (although the administration finally relented because it felt that doing so would enable U.S. troops to leave sooner).<sup>122</sup> This reluctance remained substantial even though it was clear that U.S. support was important for security in Afghanistan, since other countries have been unwilling to consider contributing more troops until the United States agrees to be involved in general support and logistics.<sup>123</sup> All of these actions by the Bush administration underscore its shaky commitment to peacekeeping by reiterating the notion that the United States will participate in certain operations but only on its own terms.

## 2. Increasing U.S. involvement in nation-building

### a. National Security Strategy

In response to September 11, the administration released its National Security Strategy (hereinafter “Strategy”) in September 2002, which essentially outlines Bush’s strategy against terrorism.<sup>124</sup> The Strategy is significant to this article because it is the first time that the administration actively endorsed the use of multilateral nation-building as a means to fight terrorism:

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118. Serge Schmemmann, *Washington Allows a 12-Day Extension for U.N. Peacekeeping Mission in Bosnia*, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2002 at A5.

119. Serge Schmemmann, *U.S. Peacekeepers Given Year’s Immunity From New Court*, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2002, at A3.

120. *Views on Security in Afghanistan: Selected Quotes and Statements by U.S. and International Leaders, The Henry L. Stimson Center*, at <http://www.stimson.org/fopo/?SN20020530366> (last visited Jan. 3, 2003).

121. Patrick E. Tyler and Elaine Sciolino, *A Nation Challenged: Policy; U.S. Sees Limited Mission in Postwar Afghanistan*, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2001, at B5.

122. Michael R. Gordon, *U.S. Backs Increase in Peacekeepers for Afghanistan*, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2002, at A1.

123. *Id.*

124. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2002), at 1-2, available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf> (last visited Jan. 3, 2003).

As we pursue the terrorists in Afghanistan, we will continue to work with international organizations such as the United Nations, as well as non-governmental organizations, and other countries to provide the humanitarian, political, economic, and security assistance necessary to rebuild Afghanistan so that it will never again abuse its people, threaten its neighbors, and provide a haven for terrorists.<sup>125</sup>

This is in stark contrast to the administration's previous rhetoric, which never even mentioned the term nation-building, let alone sanctioned its use. The Strategy represents the Bush administration's continued commitment to the concept of self-interested multilateralism.

The Strategy outlines several areas in which the United States will work to promote national security, including strengthening alliances, weapons control, trade, and expanding democracy. The Strategy also endorses the diffusion of regional conflicts in order to "deny havens for terrorists."<sup>126</sup> In particular, it summarizes the U.S. approach to assisting in the development of African states. Bush focuses on Africa because he believes strengthening the region will aid his war on terrorism. "In Africa, promise and opportunity sit aside by side with disease, war, and desperate poverty. This threatens . . . our strategic priority—combating global terror. American interests and American principles, therefore, lead in the same direction."<sup>127</sup> In alliance with European states, the United States will work to "help strengthen Africa's fragile states, help build indigenous capability to secure porous borders, and help build up the law enforcement and intelligence infrastructure."<sup>128</sup> The Strategy is "guided by the conviction that no nation can build a safer, better world alone. Alliances and multilateral institutions can multiply the strength of freedom-loving nations."<sup>129</sup> In the Strategy, Bush affirms a commitment to international organizations, including the UN, where "international obligations are to be taken seriously . . . not to be undertaken symbolically to rally support for an ideal without furthering its attainment."<sup>130</sup>

Despite Bush's commitment to international organizations, it must be remembered that the underlying purpose of the Strategy is to protect U.S. self-interest. It is important to bear in mind that all the objectives underlying the Strategy relate to the narrow objective of fighting terrorism.

### *b. Afghanistan*

The fall of the Taliban regime following September 11 has placed Afghanistan in the international spotlight. Although the fight against terrorism is still raging, the international community has begun to recognize the need to assist in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. The Bonn Accords, which took place in December 2001, established a framework by which Afghanistan will create a new

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125. *Id.* at 7.

126. *Id.* at 1, 7.

127. *Id.* at 10.

128. *Id.* at 10-11.

129. *Id.* at introduction.

130. *Id.*

government and begin to rebuild.<sup>131</sup> The question, then, is to what extent the United States will participate in the rebuilding process. Initially, President Bush did not plan to keep U.S. troops in Afghanistan to assist in nation-building. U.S. troops were sent in for the exclusive role of hunting down al Qaeda and the Taliban. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, a strong advocate against using the U.S. military in any nation-building efforts, consistently asserted that U.S. involvement should be limited to helping build an Afghan army, which would provide the quickest exit for U.S. troops.<sup>132</sup>

Today, it appears that the United States will be much more involved than initially thought. In April 2002, during a speech at the Virginia Military Institute, President Bush surprised many by emphasizing that “true peace will only be achieved when we give the Afghan people the means to achieve their own aspirations.”<sup>133</sup> This statement, interpreted by many as U.S. willingness to help nation-build in Afghanistan over the long run, exemplified the Bush administration’s dramatic shift in policy. In November 2002, the United States took significant steps to ensure Afghanistan’s stability. Since American troops have nearly ended their search for al Qaeda in Afghanistan, Secretary Rumsfeld spoke of a shift in the role of U.S. troops in the region from capturing terrorists to working on civil-military nation-building projects.<sup>134</sup> With hope that greater American military numbers in Afghanistan will facilitate large reconstruction projects and mitigate factional violence, “the Pentagon decided to send 170 additional civilian affairs soldiers to Afghanistan” to assist in securing regional centers.<sup>135</sup> Furthermore, the United States is considering using the Army Corps of Engineers to help build roads, which could facilitate trade with Afghanistan’s neighbors, helping to strengthen the country’s economy.<sup>136</sup>

Another indication that the United States will remain committed to reconstruction in Afghanistan is the widespread congressional support for nation-building efforts. The United States has already provided \$850 million in aid to the country; many legislators have argued that this is insufficient. On November 14, 2002, the Senate passed the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002, which provides for \$3.3 billion in aid to Afghanistan’s reconstruction efforts over the next four years.<sup>137</sup> This bill, supported by both Republicans and Democrats, allocates \$1.7 billion for economic, humanitarian, and development as-

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131. RICHARD P. CRONIN, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENSE, AND TRADE DIVISION, SPECIALIST IN ASIAN AFFAIRS, REPORT ON AFGHANISTAN: CHALLENGES AND OPTIONS FOR RECONSTRUCTING A STABLE AND MODERATE STATE 2 (Apr. 24, 2002), at <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/10093.pdf> (last visited Feb. 28, 2003).

132. Gordon, *supra* note 122.

133. Remarks at the Virginia Military Institute in Lexington, Virginia, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 642, 643 (Apr. 17, 2002).

134. Jim Hoagland, *3-Way War; Rumsfeld’s Anti-terrorism Balancing Act*, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2002, at A25.

135. James Dao, *Threats and Responses: Reconstruction; U.S. Shifts Emphasis in Afghanistan to Security and Road Building*, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2002, at A14.

136. *Id.*

137. *Senate Passes Afghanistan Freedom Support Act*, at <http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/sasia/afghan/text/1115act.htm> (last visited Jan. 3, 2003).

sistance to Afghanistan. It also authorizes President Bush to give ISAF \$500 million each year for the next two years.

*c. Iraq*

With the congressional passage of the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1),<sup>138</sup> and President Bush's repeated warnings to Saddam Hussein to disarm, it appears that the United States may be headed to war. In line with his policy outlined in the National Security Strategy to protect weak states at-risk of becoming breeding grounds for terrorists, President Bush has already made promises that "[s]hould force be required to bring Saddam to account, the United States will work with other nations to help the Iraqi people rebuild and form a just government."<sup>139</sup> President Bush appears to be consistently supporting nation-building operations, within a multilateral framework.

The policy outlined in the Strategy, the current administration's shift in policy towards Afghanistan, and President Bush's preparations for war with Iraq support the notion that nation-building, which nearly disappeared after the Somalia operation, has resurfaced. However, the framework under which nation-building has been revived is different than its predecessors under both the first Bush administration's "new world order" and Clinton's "assertive multilateralism." Today, nation-building is necessary not because of its inherent humanitarian value, but because it is central to U.S. security and national self-interest. As long as Americans believe that failed states breed terrorists, the United States will participate in nation-building.

#### IV.

#### CONCLUSION

As U.S. foreign policy continues to evolve to meet the demands of an increasingly global world, the United States is likely to play a large role in multilateral peacekeeping and nation-building operations. As underscored by the events of September 11, as the world becomes more connected, state policies become increasingly intertwined, and an isolated event in Afghanistan or Iraq can have massive ramifications for the entire world. Within this volatile and uncertain environment, the United States cannot afford to "go it alone;" neither is it comfortable deferring to a purely multilateral system. Instead, for better or worse, it has embarked on a path of self-interested multilateralism.

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138. Oct. 16, 2002 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002).

139. The President's Radio Address, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1702 (Oct. 5, 2002).